Beria as Hitler's agent

Hitler began the war with the USSR with a firm belief that there were agents in the highest strata of the Soviet government capable of carrying out a coup and deposing Stalin. Who was this agent?

Based on a number of evidence and real actions, it can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that one of these agents was Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

Beria in childhood

According to data obtained from the website of the FSB of the Russian Federation, it turns out that Beria was a Germanophile from childhood, and a German mentor lived in his family all his life.

«- A few kilometers from the village of Merkheuli⁽¹⁾ was the German settlement of Lindau,» says Givi’s son Zviyadi Gvindzhia, accompanying us. — Our old-timers said that little Lavrentiy would disappear for hours at the neighbors. Marta and Pavel only shrugged their shoulders when Lavrik began to pour out German phrases on the move. By the age of four, he spoke German as his native language ... And Lavrenty Pavlovich, as a family member, for many years, until his death, lived with his mentor Ella Emmanuilovna Allmendinger, who became Sergo’s home teacher. When the war began, all the Germans began to be resettled, and the governess remained to live under the wing of Beria. They reported to Stalin... Iosif Vissarionovich came to Lavrenty for lunch. Ella Emmanuilovna was at the same table with everyone else. Stalin could not stand it: «So you are the very representative of Hitler? I would never have thought that you were German»... The aristocrat was speechless. But everything worked out. Stalin laughed, began to remember Austria... «.⁽²⁾

Beria in his youth

Beria began his career at the age of seventeen in Baku in the head office of the oil company of the Swedish Nobel entrepreneurs, who were one of the main suppliers of kerosene to Germany. Carl Wilhelm Hagelin, whose son Boris Hagelin was then aged 24, worked in the same office as technical director. The acquaintance of Lavrenty Beria and Boris Hagelin is more than possible.

Later, Carl Wilhelm Hagelin and Boris Hagelin founded AB Cryptograph, which supplied encryption devices to the troops of Germany, Italy, France and the United States. After the war, the firm was transformed into the infamous «in narrow circles» Swiss company Crypto AG, which supplied encryption equipment to a number of countries, but was under the control of the BND and the NSA.

Beria before the Great Patriotic War:

Destroyed the top and middle command staff of the Red Army by 90% in such a way that in the first months of the war, the surviving leaders, such as Rokossovsky, were literally released from the cells;
Destroyed the highest and middle intelligence officers by 95% in such a way that in the first months of the war, the surviving leaders, such as Serebryansky,
were literally released from the cells; «In 1936–1940, five chiefs of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff were repressed and shot: S.P. Uritsky, A.K. Berezin, S.G. Gendy, N.N. Prokurorov, A.G. Orlov [Makolov V.V. „The Riddle“ June 22, 1941 (interview with D.T. Yazov) / V.V. Makolov // Soviet Russia. — 2005. — March 24] ».⁽³⁾
He repeatedly destroyed the senior and middle command staff of the People’s Commissariat of Communications in such a way that on June 22, 1941, the People’s Commissariat of Communications was headed by Colonel Perepelkin, who had previously been only the head of the communications squadron;
Organized the management of the Red Army for high-frequency communications, which was under the control of the NKVD, but organized in such a way that the compromise of any one communication center compromised the entire network;
Organized radio communications in the Red Army at the level of 25% equipment at the army-front level, and much less at levels below;
Organized wired communications in the Red Army at the level of «external wired lines on telegraph poles»;
Organized cryptography in all power and army units in such a way that cryptography up to the 5-digit level was decipherable, and mosaic-type cryptography was decipherable all;
He destroyed the sabotage troops by 95% in such a way that at the beginning of the war 40 (forty) saboteurs remained at the disposal of the USSR, and the head of the «sabotage troops» Sudoplatov was in the service, awaiting arrest from day to day;
espite the huge effect known to that from the use of combat tonic substances such as «Pervitin» by the Wehrmacht, there were no combat tonic substances in service with the NKVD and the Red Army;
In 1940, he gave the order to disband the personnel of partisan detachments trained in case of war and liquidate prepared partisan bases, caches of weapons and food.

Beria before the Great Patriotic War — intelligence to Stalin:

Based on the analysis of Beria’s actions in transferring intelligence information to Stalin personally, it can be concluded that he deliberately disavowed accurate intelligence data about the impending German attack, and also deliberately formed a channel for the supply of strategic disinformation, putting the clearly incompetent Kobulov at the head of the NKVD intelligence, and possibly and organizing the supply of high-quality disinformation from their German «masters».

«June 21, 1941 in the report by I.V. Beria wrote to Stalin: «I once again insist on the recall and punishment of our ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov, who continues to bombard me with „disinformation“ about Hitler’s alleged attack on the USSR. He said that this attack would begin tomorrow. The same was radioed by Major General V.I. Tupikov, military attaché in Berlin. This stupid general claims that three Wehrmacht army groups will advance on Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv, referring to Berlin agents. He brazenly demands that we provide these liars with a walkie-talkie. The head of the intelligence department, where the Berzil gang had recently operated, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, complains about Dekanozov and his Colonel Rookie, who also lies that Hitler concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western border ... But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise destiny: in 1941 Hitler on they won’t attack us!»

«By such resolutions, L.P. Beria also accompanied the reports of the NKGB foreign intelligence residents. On June 21, 1941, when the flow of reports from agents and residents of Soviet intelligence about the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR was the most intense, Beria apparently acted as a kind of „information filter“, which evaluated all reports received by the Kremlin from intelligence services, and determined what can be reported to Stalin and what cannot. Less than a day before the German invasion, Beria left the following resolution on one of the foreign intelligence reports of the NKGB: „Recently, many workers have succumbed to brazen provocations and sowed panic. For systematic disinformation, wipe the secret collaborators of Yastreb, Carmen, Verny into camp dust, as those who want to quarrel us with Germany. Others must be given a strict warning.“

This resolution of one of the most influential members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is noteworthy from two points of view.

Firstly, judging by the content of this resolution, Beria was firmly convinced that Soviet-German relations were developing, and he attributed everyone who saw anything suspicious in the system of these relations to enemies who wanted to „quarrel the USSR with Germany.“ Beria ordered such specialists to be „washed into camp dust.“

Secondly, any attempts by other agents, intelligence officers and residents who dared to send reports and reports to the Kremlin about the growing threat of an attack by fascist Germany on the USSR, Beria ordered to „severely warn“. Thus, the „Beria information filter“ completely or to a large extent deprived Stalin of documentary information about the growing threat of war.»

«In Berlin, Amayak Zakharovich Kobulov was a resident of the NKGB foreign intelligence service. He was appointed to the post of resident on the recommendation and insistence of Beria. Previously, Kobulov had nothing to do with intelligence, his education was in the volume of five classes at the Tbilisi Trade School. However, Amayak’s brother, Bogdan, was an old friend of L.P. Beria. This played a major role in the appointment of Amayak Kobulov, who did not understand anything in intelligence, as a resident in Berlin.

While working in Berlin, Kobulov sent to Moscow, along with valuable information obtained by professional intelligence officers such as A.M. Korotkov, strategic disinformation. This misinformation was personally transmitted to him by the Lyceum student agent, who was set up for Kobulov by the German state secret police (Gestapo).

In May 1947, German military intelligence major, former Gestapo man Siegfried Müller testified during interrogation: «In August 1940, Kobulov was framed by a German intelligence agent, the Latvian Berlinks, who, on our instructions, supplied him with disinformation materials for a long time.» When asked if they really managed to deceive Kobulov, Muller argued: «I am firmly convinced that Kobulov was not aware of the deception. This is evidenced by the fact that in conversations with Berlinks, he blurted out to him some information about the policy of the Soviet government in the German question ... Information from conversations with Kobulov ... was reported to Hitler and Ribbentrop.

At meetings with the «Lyceum student» Kobulov informed his «agent» that he was directing his reports personally to Stalin and Molotov.

On December 14, Kobulov reported to Moscow on the basis of Berlinks data: «...According to the Lyceum Student, Germany’s foreign policy is based on the following basic principles ... The only enemy of our country (Germany. — V.L.) is England ... .». «Germany sees its political tasks in ... avoiding a war on two fronts. At the same time, it is important to ensure good relations between the Germans and Russia...».

In a footnote to this report, it was reported that «Lyceum student received data about the impending German landing in England from a senior lieutenant. This is indirectly confirmed by the changed nature of the German air raids on London. For the «senior lieutenant», which Kobulov mentioned in the report, Hitler pretended to be, who led the work of the «Lyceum student». Through the «Lyceum student» and Kobulov, Hitler convinced Stalin that Germany would not attack the USSR, and Stalin believed this misinformation that Beria told him more than all the reports of residents and military intelligence agents.⁽⁴⁾

Beria in the Great Patriotic War:

He was immediately balanced by General Serov, who, on the personal instructions of Stalin, led the guards of the rear of the Moscow zone, in connection with which he was deprived of the opportunity to organize a coup;
Until the beginning of July, I did not notice the capture of the Brest HF communications center by a group of the Brandenberg battalion, which occurred at 03:45 on June 22, as a result of which:

the entire high-frequency communication of the USSR was compromised (it was forcibly turned off in July 1941 and restored to working condition only in November 1941);
via high-frequency communication, the Brest communication center, controlled by the Wehrmacht, requested all encryption tables for radio communications from all military units of the Red Army, which led to the complete compromise of the military radio communications of the entire RRKA (it was banned by order in July 1941 and restored to working condition only in November 1941 years after the formation of new cipher tables).

During the ENTIRE war, cryptography up to the 5-digit level was decipherable, and mosaic-type cryptography was decipherable all, which led to the possibility of decryption by the Wehrmacht of 95% of the messages of the Red Army;
Communication in the Air Force was of an unacceptable level for almost the entire war — the fighters did not have either a radio transmitter or a radio receiver until the winter of 1942, then it appeared, but it was very poor, only the Lend-Lease Air Cobras⁽⁵⁾ had good communication;
In the initial period of the war, in the winter of 1941-1942. the weak point of the German army — the supply of troops — was not violated by the partisans to a significant extent. So, in 1941 and 1942, train crashes as a result of sabotage amounted to 0.44% and 3.3% of the total number of freight traffic, and they did not have any significant impact on the supply of the Wehrmacht.
In 1941–1942, the mortality rate among groups abandoned by the NKVD behind enemy lines was 93%.
Of the 2,800 partisan detachments formed in 1941, 280 remained by 1942.⁽⁶⁾
Only 1.5% of the detachments had radios (communication with the mainland) in 1941.⁽⁷⁾It was only in the spring of 1942 that radio operators with American radios began to be sent to partisan detachments. The communication level rose 10 (ten!) times to 15% — 1 radio for 6 partisan detachments.
Until the summer of 1942, partisan detachments operating in the same operational direction had different subordination: they were simultaneously led by party committees (republican, regional, district), the fourth department of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), military councils and intelligence agencies of the fronts and armies. Unfortunately, this led to inconsistency and parallelism in work, poor-quality expenditure of forces and means, and sometimes to casualties, since all these administrative structures most often assigned tasks to the same partisan detachments without sufficient coordination of efforts among themselves.⁽⁸⁾.
Until November 1941, Beria did not even initiate the creation of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. When in November 1941 the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was nevertheless created at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, that is, outside the structure of the NKVD, L.P. Beria arrested a number of its employees under various pretexts. In a note submitted by L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin in December 1941, the inexpediency of creating the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was proved. They returned to the creation of the TsSHPD only in May 1942.

Firing discipline

But discipline in the Red Army, the NKVD under the leadership of Beria, was completely unsatisfactory. Vyacheslav Shpakovsky in his work «Firing discipline» writes the following:

So, if in the 4th quarter of 1940 there were 3,669 such emergencies, then in the 1st quarter of 1941 there were 4,649 of them, which gives an increase of 26.6%.

In 1940, 10,048 people were put out of action because of them, 2,921 of them were killed and 7,127 people were injured. In the first quarter of 1941, 3,244 people were already out of action: 945 were killed and 2,290 were wounded.

The average number of dead and wounded in 1940 was 27-28 people per day, and in the first quarter of 1941 — 36 people (TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11309, d. 26, l. 245-246). At the same time, the death and injury of people were also accompanied by the failure of military equipment or its significant breakdowns.

In October 1941, on the Western Front, 20 people were shot extrajudicially in the 30th Army, and 30 people in the 43rd Army (TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11289, d. 50, l. 126). It would seem that «their example is science for others.» However, it wasn’t there! The study showed that this extreme measure still does not provide the desired result. So, despite the executions of cowards and alarmists right at the crime scene, the 97th Rifle Division (South-Western Front) from August 6 to 8, 1941, retreated from the battlefield three times in the most disorganized way and lost 80% of its personnel, as well as a lot of equipment and weapons (TsAMO, f. 221, op. 1362, d. 34, l. 195).

In 1941, 30,782 people were convicted of desertion; in 1942, 111,994; in 1943, 82,733; in 1944, 32,723;

«In 1941, 8,105 people were convicted of self-harm, in 1942 — 35,265 people, in 1943 — 16,631, 1944 — 6,959, 1945 — 1,696. That is, in total: 68,656.

The share of evasion from participation in hostilities, as a phenomenon of violation of military discipline, in the general structure of offenses and crimes on different fronts and in different years, of course, varied. But throughout the 1,418 days of the war, it was precisely such offenses that dominated, judging by the cases of those convicted by military tribunals.

In the first half of 1941, it accounted for 58.2% of all convictions, in 1942 — 51.9%, in 1943 — 54.6%, in 1944 — 38.7% and in 1945 (the first half of the year) — 34.6%.

But the tribunals, that is, the courts, worked extremely efficiently for us.

Here, for example, what data was given in the 8th issue of the journal «State and Law» for 1995, Colonel-General of Justice A. Muranov in the article «The activities of the military justice authorities during the Great Patriotic War»: for 1,418 days of the war, they condemned 2,530,663 people. 284,344 were sentenced to death, that is, an average of 200 people were sentenced a day! True, fewer people were shot from this number. «Total» 157,593. That is, about fifteen divisions!

Fifteen divisions!

Not sickly replenishment for any army died at our hands, it was not the Germans who killed them!

In the Wehrmacht from September 1, 1939 to September 1, 1944, 7,810 people were sentenced to death by German military tribunals.⁽⁹⁾

5.12.2022

(1) Homeland Beria L.P.

(2) OUR HIMMLER Svetlana Samodelova 02/04/2004 "Moskovsky Komsomolets" (Moscow). Quoted from website of the FSB of the Russian Federation Цитата по сайту ФСБ РФ

(3) Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. POLKANOV Vladimir Danilovich, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor (Russia), Head of the Department of National History. TITOVA Evgenia Aleksandrovna, post-graduate student of the Department of National History. NABATOVA Nadezhda Nikolaevna, post-graduate student of the Department of National History. Причины поражения Красной армии в первый период Великой отечественной войны

(4) «See the red light» «Vladimir LOTA, Candidate of Historical Sciences» quotation from website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation «Увидеть красный свет»

(5) It was on them that the famous pilot Pokryshkin fought.

(6) Great War. 14 Series. Partisans. star media. Babich Design https://youtu.be/TRD0YRKHt58

(7) Ibid

(8)Central Headquarters — guerrilla. The material was prepared by the Research Institute of Military History of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, cited from the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation https://mil.ru/winner_may/history/more.htm?id=11203644%40cmsArticle

(9) Vyacheslav Shpakovsky «Firing discipline» «Расстрельная дисциплина»

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